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In this paper, we provide a pragmatist conceptualization of affective habits as relatively
flexible ways of channeling affectivity. Our proposal, grounded in a conception of
sensibility and habits derived from John Dewey, suggests understanding affective
scaffoldings in a novel and broader sense by re-orienting the debate from objects
to interactions. We claim that habits play a positive role in supporting and orienting
human sensibility, allowing us to avoid any residue of dualism between internalist and
externalist conceptions of affectivity. We provide pragmatist tools for understanding the
environment’s role in shaping our feelings, emotions, moods, and affective behaviors.
However, we contend that in addition to environment, the continuous and recursive
affective transaction between agent and environment (both natural and cultural) are also
crucially involved. We claim that habits are transformative, which is especially evident
when we consider that emotions are often the result of a crisis in habitual behavior
and successively play a role in prompting changes of habits. The final upshot is a
conceptualization of affective habits as pervasive tools for feelings that scaffold human
conduct as well as key features in the transformation of behaviors.
Keywords: affective habits, affective scaffoldings, situated affectivity, John Dewey, Pragmatism, sensibility,
emotion, habit crisis
INTRODUCTION
Habitual ways of doing, feeling, thinking, and interacting are pervasive in human behaviors.
In this paper, we will provide a pragmatist conceptualization of human habits as relatively stable,
i.e., more or less flexible, ways of channeling resources that come from both the environment and
the organism [Dreon, Human Landscapes: Contributions to a Pragmatist Anthropology, under
review, ch. 4]. The Classical Pragmatists, in contrast to the behaviorist account of habits as a
mechanical reaction to stimuli, stressed the creative power of habits to scaffold human behaviors.
According to this view, habits play a positive role in supporting and orienting human sensibility, as
well as in sustaining and nourishing cognition. They are the skeleton of human social behaviors.
We will frame our approach within the contemporary debate on affective scaffoldings and
specifically look at “affective habits” as relatively stable, i.e., more or less flexible ways of channeling
affectivity. We will thereby provide pragmatist tools for understanding the environment’s role
in orchestrating our feelings, emotions, moods, and affective behaviors. We will contend that in
addition to the environment’s influence on the agents’ behaviors, the continuous and recursive
affective transaction between agent and environment (both natural and cultural) also plays a crucial
role. This constitutive interdependence between agent and environment is what makes the very
same affective gestures habitual. It is also what makes habits essentially social. They are not mere
properties of individuals but also modes of group behavior, such as the enthusiastic support football
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fans show when their team is in trouble or the pernicious
stereotyping of minorities.
In a nutshell, we suggest considering affectivity as both
scaffolded by habits and scaffolding habits. On the one hand, we
claim that affectivity is a permanent feature of the active human
experience of the world, supported by habits. We conceptualize
habits as relatively stable—sometimes more flexible, sometimes
more routine—ways of selecting stimuli, identifying salient
features, moving toward an object of interest, and distance
oneself form or getting closer to someone else. We then shed
light on the notion of “affective habits.” In doing so, we are not
claiming in favor of a new entity, beyond “emotions,” “moods,”
and all the other items on the list of the affective states. Rather,
we take “affective habits” as a hermeneutical tool that enables
us to emphasize that affectivity is propulsive in involving and
favoring relatively regular transactions between embodied agents
and their natural as well as culturally shared environment. On
the other hand, we claim that affectivity gives rise and nourishes
more or less standardized practices, consolidated ways of facing
circumstances, socially shaped ways of praising and blaming that
remain largely unreflective. In this way, affectivity is not just
scaffolded by habits but it also scaffolds habits.
This is evident in the breaking of previous habits of acting,
feeling, and valuating. Although habits, including affective ones,
mostly work unreflectively, their breaking elicits a more reflective
analysis of the issue at stake and the active search for a new more
intelligent accommodation, namely a new form of attunement
with changed circumstances. Furthermore, although habits—
particularly habits of feeling—are often pre-personally and not
consciously acquired, their crisis pushes agents to become aware
of what they are doing, to become conscious of their own
dispositions toward others and of their responsibility within
a previously unproblematic transaction. Consequently, habit
change and habit crisis show a crucial transformative power.
In order to explain all of this in detail, some preliminary steps
are required—as well some patience on the reader’s part. First
of all, we frame our proposal within the contemporary research
on affective scaffoldings (section On Affective Scaffoldings and
Their Theoretical Background). After developing the pioneering
investigation on affective scaffoldings carried out by Colombetti
and Krueger (2015), we will contend that affective scaffoldings are
habits. This will allow us to understand affective scaffoldings in
an innovative and broader sense by re-orienting the debate from
objects to interactions. The notion of habits makes it possible to
overcome certain limitations of the contemporary literature on
affective scaffoldings, such as the predominant focus on material
culture and the function of emotion regulation. We will then
list our pragmatist correctives, which is to say that we will
present some reasons in support of our choice to speak about
sensibility instead of affectivity and to place emotions within the
continuum of sensibility itself give some preliminary explications
about affectivity, sensibility, and emotions (section Affectivity,
Sensibility, and the Emotions). In section ADeweyan Conception
of Habits we will provide a fresh introduction to the pragmatist
view of habits with a focus on the work of John Dewey. Our
pragmatist correctives will then be analytically described in the
subsequent sections. In section Affective habits, we deal with the
role of habits in scaffolding affective behaviors. In section Habit
Crisis and Emotions, we clarify why habits can be transformative
via an explication of emotions as both a result of a crisis in
habitual behavior and an active agent in prompting later habit
change. The main features and functions of affective habits
that we brought into the spotlight will be recapitulated in the
Conclusion. The final upshot is a conceptualization of affective
habits as pervasive tools for feelings that scaffold human conduct
as well as key features in the transformation of behaviors.
ON AFFECTIVE SCAFFOLDINGS AND
THEIR THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
With their ground-breaking and programmatic paper “Emotions
in theWild,” Griffiths and Scarantino (2008) have designed a new
naturalistic model for understanding emotions as both social and
intersubjective phenomena. This model is considered the best
example of what is now called “situated affectivity,” according
to which emotions are strategic moves within environmental
structures, i.e., active engagements with the social world. Griffith
and Scarantino avoid any internalist conceptualisations of
emotion, which view emotions as environmentally independent
internal states or processes that marginalize the environment’s
role (Griffiths and Scarantino, 2008, p. 437)1. As a consequence,
a situated approach to affectivity is thus one that recovers the
crucial role of the environment in producing, shaping, and
managing emotions. This means that the environment both
influences and is influenced by the unfolding of emotions
(Griffith and Scarantino, p. 438). Griffith and Scarantino have
especially stressed the social embeddedness of emotions, arguing
that they are social signals that constantly reframe relationships.
The conceptual framework is thus efficiently bi-directional and
has at its core the notion of strategic interaction.
As we will see in a moment, Dewey suggested an analogous
shift for avoiding internalist conceptions of habits nearly a
century ago, framing his theory of habits as an introduction
to social psychology (Dewey, 1983). Along similar lines, at the
beginning of the twentieth century, Georg HerbertMead strongly
favored the development of social psychology as a necessary
“counterpart to physiological psychology” (Mead, 2011, p. 9).
Acknowledging that the human environment is natural as
well as social and cultural, Griffith and Scarantino have offered
an efficient model for understanding the relationship between
evolution and social context in producing an emotion. Drawing
from the extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers,
1998), they have stressed the active role of an “environmental
scaffolding” in supporting emotions. Of particular significance
to them is the social embeddedness of emotions, specifically as
social signals that are constantly reframing relationships and are
therefore both synchronic (supporting an emotional episode)
1In doing so, they have followed the path traced by the transactional accounts of
emotion. See Parkinson (1996) and Parkinson et al. (2005).
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and diachronic (supporting the development of a repertoire of
emotional abilities) strategic moves. The active role played by the
environment should not be simply construed as a causal trigger
of affective experience. Rather, the environment offers action-
possibilities in the form of emotions. Drawing from Scarantino’s
previous work on affordances (Scarantino, 2003), Griffith and
Scarantino have thus offered an action-oriented view of non-
conceptual emotional content. In emotion, the environment is
represented in terms of what it affords2.
Drawing upon the notion of “environmental scaffolding,”
Colombetti and Krueger (2015) have defined “affective
scaffoldings” as those resources that set up, drive, and regularly
contribute to affective regulation3. Emotion-regulation is a
fundamental process that humans undertake to shape and
manage their mental lives. The externalist approach to emotion-
regulation claims that external resources are employed to adjust
and manage human feelings—as in the case of going for a
good run when one is angry and trying to appease an intense
feeling of hostility. The core idea is that specific resources
can balance human affective life if they are integrated into
structured and repeated practices of interaction. Krueger (2018)
has further distinguished three types of affective scaffoldings.
There are embodied affective scaffoldings (1), in which the
affective experience is regulated by a range of physical processes
distributed throughout our bodies, not only in the brain but also
in, for example, the digestive or hormonal systems. Just think of
how sleepy and calm you feel after having eaten a tasty plate of
spaghetti, or the intermittent phases of sorrow and anxiety that
some women feel at different phases of their menstrual cycle.
We then have social affective scaffoldings (2), in which socially
distributed feedback loops regulate the affective dynamics of
individuals and groups. This is the case, for example, with family
dinners, parties and celebrations that boost affective bonds,
or with a range of therapeutic settings where intersubjective
activities regulate affectivity. The last case is that of material
affective scaffoldings (3), in which affectivity is regulated by
the material culture that is made up of particular objects and
environments, as in the case of a wedding ring which reinforces
one’s trust in and fidelity toward one’s partner, or of a skillfully
2Although we cannot go into the rich debate on emotional content here, it is
important to mention that Shargel and Prinz (2018) have recently suggested an
enactivist theory of emotional content developed out of Griffith and Scarantino’s
view of emotions. Shargel and Prinz claim that if emotions are affordances, then
it is possible to argue for a direct relationship between emotional embodiment
and emotional content which gives credit to the embodied accounts of emotion.
However, Shargel and Prinz have also highlighted some limits to the notion
of affordance as an invariant feature of the environment to be perceived and
of emotion as a representational state. If emotions as affordances are still
representational states, they cannot fully capture the contribution of emotional
embodiment. Shargel and Prinz have thus reframed their claim in enactive terms,
which state that emotions do not represent affordances, but create affordances as
new possibilities for action. Rietveld (2008, 2012) has challenged this standard
interpretation of affordances as being in some sense objective. For Rietveld,
affordances are not mere action possibilities, but “bodily potentiating and/or
experienced as having an affective allure” (Rietveld, 2012, p. 212). This view of
emotions as skilful, unreflective actions is another important line of investigation
that can be drawn from Griffith and Scarantino.
3A fundamental reference for this proposal is the work on niche-construction
carried out by Sterelny (2010).
designed house with east-facing windows that allow for ample
morning sunlight, which ensures that you get out of bed with
more energy.
Despite Krueger’s postulation that there are three types
of affective scaffolding, most philosophical research on
environmental scaffoldings has been devoted to the last
case of material culture (Carter et al., 2016; Krueger and
Colombetti, 2018; Piredda, 2019; Colombetti, 2020). There are
exceptions, of course, but a tendency to see affective scaffoldings
as material things that help humans regulate affectivity is quite
common and widespread4. The function of affective scaffoldings
has consequently been identified as mostly affective regulation.
Although this function is undoubtedly crucial, we think other
functions should also be taken into account. As an example, let
us take the case of an academic browsing a bookshelf as a reward
after a hard day’s work, thereby enhancing their sense of self
(Piredda, 2019; see also Dings, 2017: 691). This function may
be understood as a specific type of affective regulation—in this
case, boosting self-esteem and self-efficacy. It could be objected
that this does not contribute anything new to the debate. While
we grant that self-enhancement could be a case of affective
regulation, we still think that Piredda is pointing in the right
direction. Instead of listing functions performed by affective
scaffoldings, we should shift the focus from (material) objects to
actions that are occurring, i.e., the kinds of transactions—mostly
habitual ones—through which affectivity is scaffolded. We can
thereby enlarge and partly redirect the perspective to appreciate
the pervasive presence of “affective scaffoldings” in our affective
life. This means looking at affective habits as a broader notion
that can explain how our affectivity works in its entanglement
with an environment.
“Affective scaffoldings” is a unique hermeneutical tool
that plays a fundamental role in drawing attention to the
continuous and recursive interactions with the environment
shaping affectivity. But this notion implies reducing the whole
matter to the use of a resource, be it a material item, a
person, or a culture. We would like to avoid the risk of this
implication and will therefore look at affective habits in terms of
transactions and the way they unfold, which involves constitutive
relationships between different aspects of the same environment,
including organic features and physical constraints as well as
social processes and cultural meanings. We claim that living
beings’ transactions within their environment occur affectively
and mostly habitually, or in conjunction with a habit crisis. We
suggest this conceptual shift not only out of phenomenological
accuracy but also because it seems to us that affective scaffoldings
reproduce a dualistic residue of the consumerist user-resources
relationship that overshadows their social form5. We wish to
4A noteworthy exception is Michelle Maiese, who looks at dance therapy
and peace-building practices as affective scaffoldings (Maiese, 2016). Candiotto
and Piredda (2019) too have argued that we need to primarily focus on
affective practices, instead of objects. But since their paper is not devoted to
affective scaffoldings in particular, their proposal requires further development in
this regard.
5For a critical interpretation of the user-resources relationship, see Slaby (2016)
and Candiotto and Piredda (2019).
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argue that looking at affective scaffoldings as habits can help
avoid the latter6.
For us, the important claim in Dewey’s pragmatist perspective
is that human habits are intelligent behaviors rooted at the point
of intersection between socio-cultural features and biological
resources. Human habits are about transactions of living
organisms that are embedded in an environment that is natural,
inherently social, and culturally shared since birth. We argue that
this is why habits are more than skillful actions or unreflective
repetitions of a previously conscious voluntary act and are
pervasive in human behaviors. Habits are behaviors that result
from the transactions between humans and environments over
their history. Affective habits in particular scaffold our feelings,
perceptions, interactions, and even decision-making processes.
Looking at habits thus requires a radical approach: we must hold
fast to the basic assumptions of situated affectivity and extend
them to a general theory of making human affectivity. It may
be objected that in doing so, we are abandoning a clear-cut
notion such as “affective scaffolding” in favor of a less specific
one, namely the notion of “habits,” and that as a consequence,
we will be left with nothing but approximations or, even worse,
generalizations. We are confident this is not the case, and the
main task of this paper is precisely to show how and why this
is so.
Another objection might arise from the fact that habits are
already mentioned in the literature on affective scaffoldings
(Colombetti, 2016; Maiese, 2016; Slaby, 2016; Krueger and
Colombetti, 2018). Thus, it could be objected that our proposal
is not really innovative and that habits have already been
conceptualized within the framework of affective scaffoldings.
However, we are not just making a notion that is already
prevalent in this field of study more explicit and prominent. We
also seek to correct a mistaken view of habits as a conservative
social power. In the philosophical literature about affective
scaffoldings, affective habits are unfortunately mostly understood
as simple ways of passively doing things out of custom or routine
(see, for example, Colombetti and Krueger, 2018, p. 224). As we
will see in the next sections, however, emotions can be a powerful
source of change, and habits can thus be reshaped and altered.
Affective habits are not merely customary emotional responses;
they do not simply allow the agent to become absorbed by an
affective niche, as is sometimes the case with mind invasion
phenomena (Slaby, 2016). In special situations (ones in which a
crisis triggers a revision of habits: see section Habit Crisis and
Emotions), habits are open to being amended.
6Another way to avoid this risk is to look at affective scaffoldings from the
perspective of affordances, although not according to the standard interpretation
of affordances as objective properties of the environment. The reference is
to Rietveld and Kiverstein’s new conceptual framework for understanding
affordances on the basis of exercising an ability in a specific context (Rietveld
and Kiverstein, 2014). We cannot develop the interesting overlaps between our
pragmatist solution and the notion of affective scaffolding grounded in affordances.
These overlaps certainly deserve attention in future works, but such an inquiry
clearly goes beyond the limits of this paper because it would involve an evaluation
of the extent to which a revised and extended concept of affordance (Rietveld, 2008;
Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014) and a Deweyan notion of habit converge and differ.
The last critical point we find in these studies is that
affective habit incorporation is detected especially in the body
(Colombetti, 2016). This effort is certainly praiseworthy, and we
think that affective gesture can be interpreted as affective habits
as well7. But our conceptualization of affective habits will lead
to a broader horizon of habitual actions, one in which affective
habits are also habits of perceiving, interpreting, and thinking,
as we will clarify in section Affective Habits8. Through John
Dewey’s insightful criticism of the mind-body dualism (section
A Deweyan Conception of Habits), we will be able to appreciate
both the embodied and cognitive dimension of affective habits
in the use of organic and environmental (natural and social)
resources for scaffolding human affectivity.
To sum up, we need to address the following question:
Why should we look at affective scaffoldings as habits in
pragmatist terms? First, we should do so to avoid the risk of
reducing the relevance of affective scaffoldings to the use of
environmental resources to carve out human behaviors. This
has led researchers to focus on the use of objects, which risks
promoting a consumerist user-resources relationship, if only
unwittingly. Second, we should adopt a pragmatist perspective
in order to emancipate ourselves from a passive and routine
view of scaffolded affectivity so as to bring the habits’ power of
transformation into the spotlight. Finally, we should take this
approach in order to better appreciate affective habits’ cognitive
function, and to avoid reducing them to a bodily matter.
AFFECTIVITY, SENSIBILITY, AND THE
EMOTIONS
In this approach of conceptualizing human affectivity as
something pervasively scaffolded by habits, we owe our
readers some preliminary explanations concerning the notions
of affectivity, sensibility, and the emotions that ground our
interpretive claim. In the previous section, we set the scene
by framing our discussion within the literature on affective
scaffoldings. Here, we will make our conceptual tools explicit.
Affectivity is a broader phenomenon than just emotions9. It
generally refers to “a lack of indifference, and rather a sensibility
or interest for one’s existence” (Colombetti, 2014, p. 1); it is “the
capacity, as well as the conditions of being affected (literally,
“done something”) by something,” specifically never being
“deprived of any interest, concern, or care for one’s existence
and/or world” (Colombetti, 2014, p. 5). Affectivity “permeates the
mind, necessarily and not contingently” (Colombetti, 2014, p. 1).
7We cannot argue for this thesis here, but we plan to publish a paper on it in the
near future. See also Di Paolo et al. (2018) about that.
8We have found a deep convergence with what Maiese (2016) has said about
affective framing habit, even though she makes no reference to the Pragmatists.
9In the contemporary philosophical literature, which is very much influenced by
cognitive science, “emotion” is often used as the key term to define the object
of inquiry. In cultural studies, by contrast, “affect” is the privileged term (see
Slaby et al., 2017). Slaby (2016) has put forward an inclusive framework for
understanding affective phenomena stretching from categorical emotion types to
moods, background feelings, and atmospheres. Giovanna Colombetti (2014) has
argued for the primacy of affectivity as the primordial way in which an organism
makes sense of its environment.
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This conception has at least two significant consequences. On the
one hand, affectivity cannot be considered the mere association
of discrete parts; it is rather a constant feature of human-
environment interactions10. From this point of view, emotions
must be understood against the background of affectivity and
not the other way round. On the other hand, we can no longer
assume a primarily non-affective and purely cognitive mind
which records merely descriptive states of things and eventually
colors them through subjective feelings (Nussbaum, 2001).
Pragmatism helps in a different way by developing the idea
of the pervasive nature of affectivity. “The isolation of traits
characteristic of objects known, and then defined as the sole
ultimate realities, accounts for the denial to nature of the
characters whichmake things lovable and contemptible, beautiful
and ugly, adorable and awful” (Dewey, 1988a, p. 28). This means
that agents do not first apprehend objects as neutral and only
subsequently assess them as lovable or contemptible. On the
contrary, objects are perceived as lovable and contemptible. An
item’s quality of being lovable emerges in the interaction with
a subject who experiences it as lovable. But this is not the
one-sided, powerful creation of reality by the subject, as per
Idealism. Drawing upon James’s radically empiricist claim that
relations must be assumed to be as real as discrete entities (James,
1976), Dewey stressed that being lovable is a feature of the real
relation existing between the baby and its blanket; it is not a
secondary property of the blanket because it is inscribed in
living beings’ dependence on a context by which they are always
affected in one way or another11. When needed—for example,
when the blanket is no longer at hand—we reflectively return
to our primarily holistic experience and discriminate between
the physical features of a situation in order to find a way out
of a crisis—in this example, to recover the lost blanket. But
perception is already affectively laden, which is to say that it
is charged with a meaning concerning the life of the organism
insofar as it is constituted through the interactions it has with the
environment to which it belongs and on which it depends. In a
nutshell, the focus is on the interaction between the agent and
the environment from which the object’s features and the agent’s
feelings emerge as something “in-between” (Candiotto, 2019).
In light of this, we have chosen to use the word “sensibility,”
because this term traditionally has two different meanings
10See Frijda (1986) and Lazarus (1991) that are among Colombetti’s references in
this regard.
11In Art as Experience (Dewey, 1989), Dewey makes an insightful point on a
related issue when dealing with the long-standing problem of the properties of
a picture. According to the traditional approach to the problem, the question
is: When experiencing a picture as sad, is sadness a property of the picture or
must it be ascribed to the subject, who would be projecting his or her own
mental state on an exterior object? If sadness is an attribute of the picture—so
the argument runs in the 20th-century debate on aesthetic qualities – can sadness
be reduced to the physical properties of the picture, or is it supervenient on the
character of the brush strokes and the bidimensional nature of the canvas (Sibley,
1959, 1965)? Dewey’s answer is that the whole question is ill-posed: Being sad
is a characteristic of the relation—a fully real one—between an organism (more
specifically, a naturally cultural organism) and its own environment, embracing
previous organic-environmental transactions (including cultural and meaningful
transactions in the case of humans) and which is continuously transformed by new
transactions.
and/or usages in ordinary language and technical debates.
“Sensibility” refers both to experience as perception through the
senses and to experience involving feelings, emotions, affective
valuations, and sensually-driven interests and dispositions (see
Marcuse, 1955). One of us has even suggested assuming that
this ambivalence of the word is a positive feature rather than
a linguistic flaw derived from the vagueness of ordinary speech
(Dreon, Human Landscapes: Contributions to a Pragmatist
Anthropology, under review). With respect to “affectivity,”
“sensibility” allows us to explicitly regard organic-environmental
transactions as transactions that structurally intertwine sensory-
perceptual and affective aspects, as opposed to envisaging these as
two independent dimensions that only interact at a subsequent
stage12. We adopt a definition of sensibility that shares John
Dewey’s approach to experience, which primarily refers to the
dependence of organic life on transactions with its environment.
Therefore, we define sensibility as “selective exposure to the
environment and an active capacity of feeling to discriminate
between favorable and negative aspects by organisms whose
primary experience of the surrounding environment is socio-
cultural. This is due to the organic conditions of emphasized
interdependence from others characterizing the human form of
life” (Dreon, Human Landscapes: Contributions to a Pragmatist
Anthropology, under review).
In Knowing and the Known, Dewey, with Arthur Bentley,
stated that the word “transaction” could clarify “the full organic-
environmental situation” with reference to the knowing process
(Dewey and Bentley, 1964). In other words, we should not
regard the organism and the environment as two distinct
entities that only interact at a subsequent stage, but rather
as two mutually determining processes. Organic-environmental
transactions should be considered as both epistemologically
and ontologically primary given that, an organism is both
thoroughly constituted by environmental resources and a part
of the environment, itself entering the dynamic by shaping the
environment and thus transforming it from within, albeit to a
greater or lesser degree13. Consequently, sensibility appears to be
grounded in the very conditions of organic life and dependent on
an environment for its own survival and flourishing.
Against this background, emotions can and should be
considered to be “emotional episodes” (Colombetti, 2014,
p. 25) within the continuity of affectively charged organic–
environmental transactions. Basically, we wish to adopt a
pragmatist view of emotions (Dreon, 2019). Emotions are
not external expressions of an alleged interior state of mind,
but emotive gestures of the human (inter)actions that are
12This conceptual shift from interaction to integration can be seen in cognitive
science as well. The more recent integrationist models in neuroscience show that
emotion and cognition are deeply entangled in our mental life (Gray et al., 2002;
Lewis and Todd, 2005; Pessoa, 2008, 2013). The integrationist model has now
been adopted in many specific research fields, from developmental psychology
(Labouvie-Vief, 2015) to theories about learning and skillful behavior (Gardiner,
2015).
13Incidentally, we should note that there is a convergence between Dewey’s mature
preference for the word “transaction” over “interaction” and De Jaegher and Di
Paolo’s emphasis on structural coupling and participatory sense-making in their
claim that enactivism is not interactionism (De Jaegher andDi Paolo, 2012). On the
similarities and differences between pragmatism and enactivism, see Dreon (2021).
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embedded in and responding to a specific environmental context
characterized by a sharpened level of sociality. Already at
the end of the 19th century, James criticized the idea of
an alleged “mind stuff” which pre-exists its alleged bodily
expressions (James, 1884). Largely foreshadowing the situated
view of emotions we encountered in the previous section,
Dewey emphasized that emotions are always embedded in
an environment, to which they always make a variety of
“prepositional references” (Dewey, 1971): We are afraid of
something, happy because of a specific event or relationship,
annoyed or charmed by someone (Dewey, 1981). In particular,
emotions are modes of inter-personal attunement, and function
as tools for coordinating social conduct (Mead, 2011). They
also provide the organism with a kind of affective “proto-
valuation”14 of environmental conditions connected to the
(weaker or stronger) impact that a natural and/or social feature
of the environment can have on the organism’s life—a kind of
qualitative appraisal that can later become an object of reflection
and judgment15.
In what follows, we investigate the varieties of ways through
which sensibility and emotions are intimately connected with
habits, given an ecological conception of habit inspired by
Dewey’s statement that they are functions of the organism
as well as the environment (Dewey, 1983). By “ecological,”
we mean that both organic and environmental features are
equally essential traits of the constitution of habits. We
should not assume that merely external constraints condition
basically internally determined behaviors. This point is grounded
in a Deweyan view that the human organism is part of
the environment and that it acts in it and through it.
Consequently, distinctions between a living being and the
environment it belongs to should be regarded as being
operative and context-dependent, and not an ontological
divide (Dewey, 1989, p. 19, see Alexander, 1987, p. 135 on
this point).
14In using “proto-valuation,” we make reference to Dewey’s famous distinction
between “valuing” and “evaluating” in his essay “Theory of Valuation” (Dewey,
1988b). Valuing consists in a form of immediate refusal or acceptance, praise,
or blame, while evaluating involves a more reflective attitude. However, it is
important to emphasize that in Dewey’s view, the emotions play an important role
in both processes. Consequently, these processes (valuing and evaluating) should
be considered as parts of a continuum and not as opposing allegedly irrational
valuations to cognitive evaluations. Here we are referring to the first function,
namely how emotions can provide a direct valuation in terms of acceptance
and refusal. In section Habit Crisis and Emotions, we highlight the evaluative
function played by the emotions in situations of crisis in habitual behaviours.
Accordingly, emotions work as a source of more conscious forms of facing
problematic circumstances. Therefore, they can have an epistemic function.
15Giovanna Colombetti (2007), in this regard, has sharply remarked that we cannot
split appraisal and arousal in the affective experience, as has been done by the
cognitivists. This means that the evaluation enabled by the emotions is largely
constituted by felt experience. Works on affective valence have in fact showed how
much felt experience is already a form of evaluation (Charland, 2005; Colombetti,
2005). Although we employ the concept of “proto-valuation” as specified in
footnote 12, we find an important reference to the enactive conceptualisation of
“proto-evaluation” by Colombetti because it involves a clear distance from and
an alternative to a cognitivist view of emotional evaluation. In this regard, see
also Helm (2002, 2009) and Döring (2007), where pleasure and pain constitute
a distinctive and intrinsically motivating evaluation that is shared with emotions
and desires.
A DEWEYAN CONCEPTION OF HABITS
In order to support our claim that sensibility and the emotions
are scaffolded through habits, we will now outline a pragmatist
conception of habit derived from Dewey16. In recent years,
enactivist scholars have devoted specific attention to habits as a
key concept for understanding human behavior and agency (see
Ramírez-Vizcaya and Froese, 2019 for an overview), providing
an opportunity to overcome the standard behavioristic account
of habit as an automatization derived from the mere repetition of
a stimulus-response association (Egbert and Barandiaran, 2014,
see also Barandiaran and Di Paolo, 2014). In agreement with
this effort, we draw upon a new conception of habits in the
present paper that is derived from Dewey. Matthew Egbert and
Xavier Barandarian have proposed a “holistic” view of habits
as “self-maintaining patterns of behavior that share properties
in common with self-maintaining biological processes, and that
inhabit a complex ecological context, including the presence and
influence of other habits” (Egbert and Barandiaran, 2014, p.
1). Their conception of habits is holistic insofar as it assumes
that perception and action are two sides of the same process,
occurring habitually rather than through mental representations.
However, they do not take into due consideration the role of
affectivity as a third intimate factor in action and perception.
Therefore, we propose a “transactional,” “ecological” model of
affective habits that radicalizes the role of the natural, social,
and cultural environment in shaping habitual behaviors. By
“transactional” and “ecological,” we mean a model positing
the negotiation between the human organism and the natural
and naturally social environment of which it is a part as
a constitutive feature. The pragmatist tradition attributed a
fundamental role to habits in nature. As emphasized by Frank
Lorimer, habit formation is involved in the dynamic of building a
provisional equilibrium within each organism’s interactions with
the environment (Lorimer, 1929, p. 12), giving them their mutual
constitution, although to a differing extents and at different times.
This broadly biological stance is the reason why in the first pages
of his Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey compares habits and
physiological functions, because they are both “functions of the
surroundings as truly as of a person” (Dewey, 1983, P. 15). He
draws an interesting parallel between breathing and digesting on
the one hand, and walking and speech on the other, to support
the claim that both the former and the latter require transactions
between organic energies and environmental features. Just as
breathing depends on lungs and the air, walking is a function
of the length of one’s legs and agility, as well as of the ground’s
structure. This means that bodily characters contribute to the
constitution of habits as much as the surroundings’ material
conditions. The second example is even more challenging: Just
as digesting is an affair of the stomach as much as of food, speech
“demands physical air and human companionship and audience
16At present, there are a good number of works on Dewey’s conception of habit,
cf.: Colapietro (2004), Shusterman (2008), Dreon (2010), Crossley (2013), Sullivan
(2013), Quéré (2016), Dreon (2016), and Steiner (2021). An interesting attempt
to use Dewey’s notion of habit within an enactivist background can be found in
Ilundáin-Agurruza et al. (2018).
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as well as vocal organs” (Dewey, 1983, p. 15). Evidently, linguistic
habit shaping is the function of a variety of factors: physiological
predispositions, organs, and the highly social structure of the
human environment. Given Dewey’s continuity thesis on natural
and cultural features within the human world (see Dewey on
cultural naturalism in Dewey, 1991, p. 48), habits are constituted
by social and cultural features of the human environment as well
as by physiological conditions.
In accordance with this view, we suggest understanding habits
as “more or less flexible channelings of both organic energies and
environmental resources,” including the human niche’s socio-
cultural features (Dreon, Human Landscapes: Contributions to
a Pragmatist Anthropology, under review). This conception, we
argue, is not only able to overcome the dichotomy between
neurological processes and psychological or mental features, but
can also incorporate the function of the human socio-cultural
environment in shaping habits of action, feeling, and thought17.
Anti-dualism and continuity between natural and socio-cultural
features are two pivotal points that prove to be particularly
advantageous when dealing with sensibility and adopting a
situated view of affectivity without denying the brain’s role. From
this perspective, neural processes are clearly important features
of a specific action or a peculiar emotion, but they are not
in themselves the most decisive factors. Other aspects play a
significant role in shaping one’s habits of action and/or feeling,
such as bodily characteristics, training, and capacities, as well as
already existing practices within a specific social context and the
related meanings associated with them. All of these elements are
important factors within a specific channeling of the resources
involved in each organic-environmental transaction by which the
organism and the environment are dynamically and mutually
(even if at different degrees) constituted. For example, many
different aspects—both organic and environmental—provide an
important contribution toward shaping teenagers’ more or less
provocative ways of behaving at home: an aggressive habit is
a function of their suddenly augmented bodily strength and
vocal tone and timbre, as well as of the gestures, demands, and
responses from their parents.
We would argue that adopting this view of habits as the
scaffolds of sensibility is advantageous in that it avoids a still
dualistic reading of the situated affectivity approach as opposed to
the preeminent internalist, brain-centered approach. We should
no longer oppose the “inner” features of emotions to their
“outer” conditions: the conditions of habits appear to be a key
concept for overcoming any dualistic residues and for assuming
that the discriminations between intra-organic and extra-organic
factors are largely functional, which is to say context-dependent.
They should not be regarded as ontologically primary and as
grounding hierarchies that make certain features allegedly more
decisive than others—neither by considering emotions to be
17The pragmatist approach to habits we are developing here shares the same aims
as situated views of affectivity, for example when it is stated that situated affectivity
goes beyond “the sterile debate over nature and nurture” (Griffiths and Scarantino,
2008, p. 12). This is also case in terms of its scope, for example when affordances
are employed to account for socio-cultural practices in shaping the human niche
(Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014, p. 326).
determined by brain programs nor by seeing them as something
culturally constructed and induced.
There are at least two other reasons for supporting a
broadly Deweyan conception of habits when considering their
connections with human sensibility and the emotions. On the
one hand, this conception helps overcome the dualism between
individual behavior and social practice through a theory of
habit acquisition occurring “at a largely pre-personal level, by
matching the practices, issues, and interlocutors we find in
the already broadly habitualized social environment we belong
to and interact with from birth” (Dreon, Human Landscapes:
Contributions to a Pragmatist Anthropology, under review).
Evidently, there are cases where a habit is acquired by the
repetition of an initially voluntary act—as when, for example,
students learn to type on their laptops to do their homework
or to buy something on the Internet. However, most habits,
particularly in early infancy, are acquired by affective attunement
to the social context. Consider the case of cry modulations in
infants. We suggest considering them as affective habits because
they convey bodily feelings that are fashioned through natural
and social conditions, i.e., they are more or less flexible ways
of channeling both organic and environmental resources within
specific situations and transactions. Infants do not only cry
differently because of different needs—for example being hungry
or angry, wanting warmth and protection, being annoyed by a
stomachache, or the lack of a caregiver. Very early on, infants
can attune their crying to their interlocutor; they cry differently
depending on whether they are with their mother or father, and
when they are in the presence of a third person, depending on
whether this individual is a stranger or someone bringing them
a bottle of milk. As emphasized by Mead, imitation cannot be
assumed to be a key concept in the acquisition of habits of
conduct and feeling (Mead, 2011). Rather it is better to adopt an
ecological approach by considering the human environment to
be naturally social at one’s birth and already characterized by ways
of doing things and of being affected by situations, things, and
other persons that pre-exist each individual’s act. In other words,
the human environment is already strongly habitualized, and
habit acquisition largely occurs in an individual via attunement,
accommodation, and responses to environmental invitations,
affordances, or even dissuasions to feel, think, and act that are
already enacted by the family or community group to which a
young person belongs.
In fact—and this leads us to a further reason for supporting
a broadly Deweyan conception of habits—the role of the agent
in habitual behavior comes to the fore in the changing of
habits, such as when an old habit of action, thinking, or feeling
becomes obsolete and enters into crisis because it is no longer
capable of responding to a new situation. This means that
widespread feelings can change and be modified, whether for
better or worse. It also means that habits are not impermeable
to cognition, but are (or can be) a way to intelligently re-
orient one’s own action. For example, racist epithets and hate
and diffidence toward immigrants are becoming increasingly
frequent in Europe. However, it is not unusual to meet people
from the Lega Party in Northern Italy who have developed an
almost protective attitude toward migrants because they have
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come to know their personal story or have worked with them.
Arguably, they changed their specific habits of thinking, feeling,
and interacting with regard to immigrants18. In a nutshell,
Pragmatism provides a theory of habit change that is crucial when
assuming that habits are pervasive in human conduct and cannot
be put aside by purely rational decision-making. As pointed out
by Dewey, habits not only become routine when they grow to
be fixed and dull, tending to replicate the same behavior even
though the conditions at work have changed. Habits can also be
intelligent (Dewey, 1983) when they are flexible and capable of
responding to a different situation, i.e., when they maintain the
peculiarly high degree of plasticity and relative indeterminateness
that is typical of human transactions with the world.
Based on these premises, we will explore the
(inter)connections between habits, sensibility, and the emotions
in two different ways in the following sections. First, we will deal
with the general thesis that sensibility is scaffolded by habits, and
we will fine-tune the features of our account of affective habits.
Second, we will recover Dewey’s (and Darwin’s) claim that an
emotion can arise when there is a crisis in habitual action. We
believe that this is an important insight because it sheds light on
the connection between emotion and cognition, as well as on the
possibility of changing one’s own habits of feeling, a point clearly
involving broad political consequences.
AFFECTIVE HABITS
In this section, we will consider the general thesis that sensibility
is scaffolded by habits, which is to say by ways of feeling, acting,
selecting, knowing, and believing. Affective habits are all kinds
of habits that (a) play an essential function in prompting human
sensibility. They are then in turn (b) produced, nourished, and
reset by our affectively charged transactions with the world.
We therefore call “affective habits” those habits that scaffold
sensibility, and which at the same time are supported by our
sensibility. By speaking of “affective habits,” we do not wish to
introduce a new kind of entity in the taxonomy of affective states.
Rather, we are presenting “affective habits” as a hermeneutical
tool that helps analyze affective experiences in both their passive
and active dimensions. In particular, this tool allows us to see
that sensibility is not just scaffolded by habits, but that it also
scaffolds them. Let us recap what we said in section Affectivity,
Sensibility, and the Emotions about sensibility and in section A
Deweyan Conception of Habits about a pragmatist conception of
habit, so as to shed further light on ourmotivations for employing
this notion, instead of simply speaking of affective responses,
for example.
Sensibility involves ways of acting that partly stabilize
bodily reactions and are partly acquired from one’s own group
unreflectively, yet refashioned through one’s own life history. But
this does not mean that sensibility is a matter of discrete reactions
18It can be objected that they changed their habits only regarding the specific
person they met at work, and not regarding immigrants in general. However, even
if this is the case, this specific habit change regarding a specific person can then
trigger an overall revision of habits, especially if it will produce a new habit of
interaction with the colleague.
to discrete stimuli. Rather, human sensibility is largely habitual,
including as it does relatively standardized ways of selecting
stimuli within the environment, as well as ways of reacting that
are both organic and socio-culturally established. From this point
of view, emotions often appear to be breaks in the continuum
of habitual ways of feeling and acting when significant changes
in the surrounding context occur. Complementarily, emotions
and feelings contribute to shaping and consolidating habitualized
behaviors and practices, deeply affecting the stabilization of
norms and customary morality. Their influence on individual
conduct is so powerful because they involve organic-cultural
entanglements that anchor significant actions in bodily postures,
sensory-motor agency and vice versa.
As we will see in a moment, the bidirectionality implied by
this conceptualization of sensibility is fundamental because it
allows us to grant a positive and transformative role to affective
habits, and thus to respond to the criticism that habits are merely
conservative and routine forces.
Affective habits are essentially social: they are set up in social
settings and simultaneously enacted by the agent in her affectively
charged transactions with the environment. The process of
affective habit generation is thus efficiently circular because it
emerges within the recursive transactions between agent and
environment. This means that affective habits are neither the
result of a particular conscious process of carving out one’s
own affective style, nor of one-sided social conditioning by
the environment. They are the product of affectively charged
transactions with the social world—a naturally social one, as
stated by the Pragmatists.
Habits require a constitutive “cooperation of organism and
the environment” (Dewey, 1988a, p. 15). For affective habits,
this means that human ways of feeling are scaffolded by the
environment, including common practices and feeling attitudes
as well as existential conditions that are already there—be they
good or bad habits. At the same time, this means that the agent’s
affective needs and interests are an integral part of the carving out
of the environment.
For heuristic purposes, let’s first focus on the process that
runs from the environment to the organism. Human habits
are social functions (Dewey, 1988a, p. 15): they are set up,
nurtured, and revised within a social setting. They are functional
for acting in this social environment. This means that affective
habits are embedded in social settings and perform pragmatically
oriented actions in affording these environments. Consequently,
affective habits cannot be considered the simple outcome of
organic factors, butmust rather be regarded as forces that channel
social energies.
Consider the affective habit of feeling suspicious and wary
when you meet something new—let’s say an Indian dish you
have never tasted before if you are Italian. Your affective habit
of suspiciousness derives from the culture you are born in, such
as a closed society distrustful of cultural differences, as well as
from the physiological conditions of your stomach; for instance,
if you’re suffering from gastritis and have experienced discomfort
in the past after eating unusual kinds of food. But we can easily
imagine a different scenario. For example, you might display
an affective habit of curiosity and excitement when having the
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chance to taste an Indian dish. Many reasons may lay at the
basis of this different habit—such as being accustomed to eating
curries and tolerating spicy food from an early age, since your
mum is a fan of Indian cuisine and thus you are used to eating
different kinds of food. Or, it could simply be because you live in
a multicultural city like London, São Paulo, or Singapore where
there are diverse restaurants everywhere. Therefore, what comes
into play in the affective habits of feeling suspicious or, on the
contrary, feeling curious when encountering novelties are both
their organic features and the culture in which you live.
From a pragmatist point of view, “culture” should be
envisaged in its concrete form here, as well as in its continuity
with nature, i.e., as including the natural environment insofar it
is modified from the inside by human interventions. Culinary
preferences and disgust (a highly debated topic in recent years:
see for example Menninghaus, 2003; Korsmeyer, 2011) are clear
cases where organic and socio-cultural aspects are channeled
into affective habits, whereby it becomes difficult to trace a
boundary between the two features. As Dewey wrote, there is
the co-presence of “a society or a specific group of fellow-men”
in habits (Dewey, 1988a, p. 16) because of the human species’
conditions of stark dependence at birth. Therefore, what really
matters is the specific location involved in the generation of
affective habits, such as living with your mother who is a fan
of Indian food, thus nourishing your culinary open-mindedness,
as well as gradually accustoming your stomach to spicy food.
Dewey said that usual ways of feeling, acting, and thinking are
already present at birth and shape the child’s environment19; for
the most part, even adults are embedded in broadly affective
habitual practices without focusing on them. (Slaby, 2016) uses
the expression “mind invasion” to describe this power of the
environment to shape and modulate individual affective styles
contrary to the individual’s prior orientations. He adduces the
example of workplace affects, whereby interns “have to habituate
in various informal ways (. . . ) in order to become ‘one of them,’
where this being ‘one of them’ will crucially include numerous
forms of affective comportment and a particular affective style.”
(Slaby, 2016, p. 1) Pivotal work has been done on this aspect
by Pierre Bourdieu, who has emphasized how far the habits
of one’s own social group of belonging—the class habitus—can
shape individual conduct and actions by affecting even one’s
own preferences and refusals at a pre-reflective, bodily level
(Bourdieu, 1979).
This is crucial because it clearly explains that it is not the
case that an agent feels something ex nihilo and then repeats
this feeling until it becomes an almost automatic part of her
affective behavior. Rather, her actions and transactions are
already embedded in a specific affective context of practices and
meanings which shapes them. This involves explicitly giving up
methodological individualism as a privileged approach to habits
by claiming that “a belief of exclusive ownership” (Dewey, 1988a,
19“Each person is born an infant, and every infant is subject from the first breath
he draws and the first cry he utters to the attention and demands of others. These
others are not persons in general with minds in general. They are beings with
habits, and beings who upon the whole esteem the habits they have” (Dewey, 1983,
p. 43).
p. 15) is misleading. De Beauvoir (2012) said that one is not
born, but rather becomes, a woman. Bringing de Beauvoir’s
pivotal insight into our topic means that women’s ways of feeling,
affective gestures, and desires are shaped by the society into which
they are born. It is society that equips themwith the affective style
proper to a woman.
But we need to be careful. Our model of affective habits,
which stresses their social-normative character, is not another
culture-dependent view of sensibility. Rather, we derive from
Dewey the claim that habits are a channeling of both organic
and environmental resources. Consequently, even if the weight
of the cultural norms that condition the ways women move,
feel, think, and speak within different social contexts is of huge
importance, the fact that women can get pregnant (or sometimes
that they cannot) strongly affects their sensibility and contributes
to shaping it.
We also wish to distance ourselves from a conservative view
of affective habit generation as the result of society’s ubiquitous
conditioning powers. As Slaby rightly pointed out, there are
many cases of the exploitation of affective habits in certain
contexts our affective societies, ranging from the workplace
to marketing and advertising sectors20. As philosophers and
pragmatists, we need to denounce this. But this is not a universal
rule. In pragmatist terms, habits are apt to change, and they play
positive roles in shaping the environment. We will discuss habit
change in the next section. Here we will consider the carving out
of the environment in terms of affective niche construction.
This also means that we are not required to see the process of
affective habit generation as one-sided. Therefore, let’s consider
the other direction of the process we have already introduced at
the beginning of this section, which goes from the agent (whether
it be an individual or a group of people) to the environment.
Arguing for the radical embeddedness of affective habits means
focusing not simply on the setting, but also on the interactions
with a group of people to which an individual belongs. Therefore,
this radical embeddedness is a matter of having a transaction
with an environment—and not just of being influenced by it. It
follows that individual sensibility can shape habits by virtue of
their transaction with a social setting, which is the case when we
regulate our habitual affective moods, for example, by listening to
rock music and drinking coffee if one wakes up in the morning
and is feeling sluggish and does not want to go to work. There
is already much literature on affective scaffoldings, so there is no
need for us to dwell on the topic.What should be highlighted here
is the fundamental role of an agent’s transactions with a social
environment in the generation of affective habits.
Colombetti and Krueger (2015) have described the features
of this carving out of an environment as affective niche
construction. Affective niche construction is the active
manipulation and transformation of an environment in
response to the agent’s affective needs and interests. This affective
20It is important to stress that mind invasion works against the prior orientation of
the individual. Thus, this is not a general thesis about the power of the environment
over the individual, but a precise analysis of a specific phenomenon: the one in
which the affective habits endorsed by an individual immersed in an affective
culture are detrimental for the individual in question.
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coupling with a social environment is triggered by the agent’s
sensibility, i.e., in line with situated affectivity or—we might also
say—with pragmatic sensibility. Sensibility is action-oriented
and makes humans feel what they care for most. Once again,
this means that agents are not just absorbing society into their
affective habits, but are at the same time crafting society insofar
as this is oriented by their sensibility. Agents can transform a
social environment from within by being embedded in it, i.e., by
transacting with it. Affective habits are therefore “ways of using
and incorporating the environment in which the latter has its say
as sure as the former” (Dewey, 1988a, p. 15).
To sum up, we have highlighted the fact that agent-
environment transactions are always affectively charged by
recalling that for Dewey, “transaction” refers to the structural
forms of cooperation between an organism and its environment
(see Quéré, 2016 on this point). These transactions underlie
the generation of affective habits, insofar as they are enacted
within an integrated system of mutual relationships. Sensibility
and habits are strictly intertwined in organic-environmental
transactions, although for the sake of analytical clarity we have
distinguished two movements: one from habits to sensibility,
the other from sensibility to habits. As Dewey stated in his
Significance of Emotions, “I suppose one is fairly entitled now to
start from the assumption of the sensory-continuum, the ‘big-
buzzing-blooming confusion,’ out of which particular sensory
quales are differentiated. Discrimination, not integration, is the
real problem” (Dewey, 1971, p. 179).
One last point should be mentioned before moving on to
habit change in the next section. This capacity of affective
habits to carve out the environment should not be restricted
to the “affective zone.” Affectivity can shape cognition.
Notably, Maiese (2016) has argued that an affective niche
also enables the realization of specific cognitive capacities. She
highlights that affective habits of framing and selective attention
scaffold cognition. One example she adduces is a musician
who understands herself and her surroundings in new ways
while regulating her moods by playing an instrument21. Self-
understanding is undoubtedly a cognitive process and, in this
case, has been activated by the affective habit of playing a musical
instrument for mood regulation. This case is of paramount
importance because, as we will see in the next section, that a
revision of habits is possible precisely because of emotions. Habit
revision clearly brings a cognitive dimension into play.
HABIT CRISIS AND EMOTIONS
A specific field of inquiry with regard to the connections
between emotion and habits is the breaking or crisis of already
existing habits, which generally occurs when an agents’ previously
habitual ways of behaving no longer fit a given context. We will
tackle the issue by recovering some insights fromDewey and then
21The example of the musician comes from Colombetti (2016). Colombetti
adduces it as a case of emotion regulation, but Maiese’s point is that the habit of
playing the piano for emotional regulation also entails cognitive outcomes—in this
case, self-understanding.
developing the consequences of this view with reference to the
cognitive value of emotions and their role in habit change.
As claimed in the previous sections (A Deweyan Conception
of Habits and Affective Habits), from a Pragmatist perspective,
habits appear to be largely socially acquired, often at a
pre-personal level through adjustments with already existing
practices and an affectively grounded mutual coordination of
gestures oriented toward an action goal—either a common one
or one that is an object of contention. Regarding the topic of habit
change, it is useful to consider Dewey’s engagement with Charles
Darwin’s third principle for explaining emotion, with reference
to so-called cases of “direct nervous discharge.” According to
Dewey’s interpretation, Darwin gathered “idiopathic” emotions
apparently lacking a specific cause and characterized by an
overflow of organic energies under this label, even though the
principle of the direct action of the nervous system does not
deny that autonomic changes can have a cause, such as when one
blushes because of being ashamed (Darwin, 1872). In contrast,
Dewey considered these emotions to be “cases of the failure
of the habitual teleological machinery” (Dewey, 1971, p. 139),
where a previous existing habit is no longer suited for a novel
or modified situation.
Consider, for example, scholars who are presenting a talk or
teaching in class using slides projected on a screen. Something
may go wrong: theWi-Fi connection may not work, perhaps they
forgot their flash drive at home, or maybe a student asks them
an odd, unexpected question. The situation can become more
or less disruptive, depending on the lecturer’s past experiences,
the audience’s degree of patience, and so on. In any case, a
certain degree of anxiety, embarrassment, and disorientation
will typically occur. The situation can be easily resolved if the
lecturer is an experienced speaker, but it can also give rise to
a small personal crisis: through this distress, the scholar may
become aware of the extent to which her thinking is dependent
on fixed formulas or rigid argumentation schema. She may then
problematize her habits themselves and try to modify them so as
to render her teaching more vivid and clear. This is where a form
of behavior that has become customary (in current academia)
can be reflected on and revised, or even replaced by a new habit
of teaching.
Consider the crisis of linguistic habits between different
generations and/or between diverse linguistic registers and social
contexts. Teenagers typically develop a jargon by spending
time with their peers, chatting on the web, or playing online
video-games together. They absorb from their peers not only
a particular way of speaking but also modes of interacting,
responding, and engaging with their partners. These are felt as
obvious within their social group and nourish their sense of
inclusion and belonging—or exclusion with reference to those
who do not share their habits of speaking, feeling, and acting.
When speaking with an adult, they tend to push their speech
toward a more controlled use of words. But sometimes they
are unable to perceive that a certain mode of speaking—not
only the choice of words, but also their tone of voice, a certain
melodic line, interjections, and bodily gestures—can be perceived
as aggressive, offensive, and confrontational by an adult. This can
lead to a quarrel, a state of anger and frustration, or a feeling of
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having being misunderstood. This kind of affectively grounded
awareness can emerge because of an unexpected answer by the
adult interlocutor (amother’s angry answer or a critical note from
a teacher) that tends to produce an individual reconsideration
of a customary behavior and a redirection of the previous habit.
Teenagers may then either drop their old mode of behavior and
replace it with a gentler way of expressing themselves, or reinforce
the previous habit if they feel that they are not receiving the
acknowledgment they deserve from adults.
Generally, we could state that a crisis in habitual transactions
with one’s own environment and social group for the most part
gives rise to an emotion that, on the one hand, manifests the
habit crisis, and on the other elicits a revision of the habit itself.
This revision consists of a more reflective attitude whereby the
individual adopts a more responsible role in the literal sense of
the term—that is, it occurs when and because the agent is obliged
to respond to a changed situation that frustrates her previous
ways of behaving.
A series of implications derive from this approach to
habits and emotions as strictly intertwined aspects of behavior.
First, affective habits, while being largely pre-personal and
pre-reflective, are not at all foreign to cognition, but rather
continuous with it. An emotion caused by a crisis in habitual
behavior will either confirm old habits of thinking or elicit their
revision, reorienting the person toward an alternative solution
to her problem: it “opens the eyes” of the individual to what
is no longer functioning as it used to and boosts the search
for alternative modes of thinking. As is well-known, a reflective
process of inquiry, for the Pragmatists, cannot begin in the void,
from an artificial doubt (Peirce, 1868). There must be a real doubt
for a cognitive process to arise and such doubt only emerges when
one no longer knows what to do, when one’s habitual behavior
no longer works because it does not fit a changed situation.
Hence, the transaction must be re-directed so as to produce a
new belief or habit of action (Peirce, 1877). In a nutshell, the
breaking of an old habit and the establishment of a new one lie
at the core of cognition for the Pragmatists. Our point here is
to emphasize that this break does not happen to a mind that is
fundamentally non-affective. Consequently, it is urgent and real
insofar as the life of fully embodied and embedded beings is at
stake, to a weaker or stronger degree, when a habitual transaction
is disrupted. Their interests, desires, and needs are at play and
will constitute a crucial criterion for orienting and checking the
efficacy of a specific process of thinking, as suggested by Dewey
through his idea of “affective” or “qualitative thought” (Dewey,
1984, 1988a).
Second, affective habit crises can engender an affectively
grounded form of awareness and self-reflectivity in which one
feel’s her own part and responsibility within a shared action and
(either peaceful or aggressive) interaction. This is particularly
clear in Dewey’s conception of the moral process as a transition
from “customary morality” to “reflective morality” (Dewey,
1985). Customary morality consists of pre-existent social habits
and norms, widespread sensibility, common preferences, and
refusals pervading the environment to which one belongs. These
entrain one’s behavior very early on. In this deflationary sense, it
can primarily be understood with reference to reflective morality,
consisting in the process of revising and rejecting the habits of
action, feeling, and thought one has inherited and absorbed from
one’s social group, or in the adoption of new and more conscious
ones because one’s usual ways of behaving have entered into crisis
and been disrupted for different reasons. Individual decision-
making occurs against the largely habitual-affective background
of pre-existent customs and consists in the capacity to re-invent
one’s own actions through imaginative, affective, and cognitive
resources (Dreon, 2020).
To conclude, habits can change and are often disrupted in
ordinary life. Of course, habits can be conservative and exert a
regressive effect on social action (James, 1983). However, Dewey’s
work helps us realize that they are also flexible and diverse,
and that they can be changed not merely through an allegedly
voluntary act of the will exercised by pure consciousness,
but when the conditions for their existence change—such as
the organic conditions or the environmental context—because
of either individual impulses or unexpected events. Both the
moment of crisis and the phase of reconstruction are charged
with affective value given that the transactions at stake are not
merely contemplative, but have an impact—be it big or small—on
the life of the organism.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have provided a pragmatist conceptualization of
affective scaffoldings as habits. We have employed the notion of
affective habits to depict themain features of this conceptual shift.
We will now summarize what we believe to be the main benefits
of our proposal.
First, we have an active (channeling of energies) and
transformative view (habit change and revision) of affective
scaffoldings. This is an ameliorative move because it allows
us to respond to an exclusively conservative view of habits.
Thus, our proposal offers an open, pluralist, and transformative
conceptualization of affective habits that we think can serve
as a starting point for further research on their ethical and
political dimensions.
Second, our account helps to understand the relationship
between the pre-reflective dimension of affectivity (very much
stressed in the literature on affective scaffoldings) and cognition
in terms of continuity. By looking at the role of emotions in
habit crises, we have especially highlighted the role of affectivity
in framing habits of thought by making essential reference
to the work carried out by Dewey in engaging with Darwin.
We believe that this is beneficial for further developing the
research on situated affectivity without neglecting the cognitive
dimension that is crucial in the intertwining of sensibility and
the environment.
Third, by proposing affective transactions at the core of the
creation of habits, we have stressed an aspect that, although
present, has not received sufficient attention in the literature on
affective scaffolding, namely, the view of affective habits as ways
of interacting. We think that this shift is crucial for avoiding the
risk of understanding affective scaffoldings in terms of resource
employment, thereby definitively eradicating dualistic residues.
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This last point led us to the main feature of our approach, namely
the attempt to understand affective habits as something “in-
between” —at once organic and cultural, individual and social,
pre-reflective and cognitive, routine, and transformative.
In this paper, we have advanced a specific conceptualization of
affective habits as relatively flexible ways of channeling affectivity.
By suggesting that affective scaffoldings be understood as habits,
we do not lose any phenomenological accuracy. On the contrary,
we can get a broader and more nuanced picture of our affective
transactions with natural and social environments.
We believe that a strong emphasis on the intertwining
of sensibility and habits could have significant consequences
for interpretations of our present society. On the one hand,
considering that sensibility functions in a habitual manner means
assuming that, as in one of our examples, racial prejudices
are nourished by habitual actions while also reinforcing
discriminatory habits. From this perspective, habitual sensibility
certainly involves a regressive dimension that can explain some of
the most dangerous social conditioning processes. On the other
hand, however, our approach allows some room for change that
is not driven by pure will but comes from the transformation of
those conditions that constitute habits, with regard to both agents
and society. For example, when some of the racists mentioned
above become old and require assistance from strangers, since
their former intimate social relations are gone, they will feel
vulnerable and bond with their caretakers. This change of
existential condition can trigger a change of habits and prompt
a change of sensibility toward foreigners. Of course, there is no
guarantee that habits will change in a pro-social way: dependence
on other people can also reinforce prejudices, resentment, and
hostile actions. But our point is that habit change happens—and it
happens every time there is a transformation of either the agential
or environmental features constituting a habit. Furthermore, we
have also stressed that habit change is possible; it cannot be
excluded a priori. And this means that we can activate processes
of habit revision at both the individual and the societal level.
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